In his theory of science, Karl R. Popper (Logik der Forschung [The Logic of Research], Tubingen, 1984, 8th edition) does not deal with sciences as factual data, but constructs an untestable ideal image of it that ignores the difference between one-level or pure relationship sciences (eg, formal logic) & two-level or theoretical-empirical sciences (eg, sociology). His deductionist model rests on the assumption that the empirical basis of science is unstructured, & that order is basically only found in logic, & thus, presumably in human thought. As other representatives of such a nominalist creed in the tradition of classical European philosophy, he is unable to recognize that human knowledge proceeds in an intergenerational process of enlarging &, in part, of better adapting the social fund of knowledge to existing structures of the universe. Occasional hints at the necessity of "intersubjective testing," which pretend to offer some insight into the social character of human knowledge, stand almost unconnected in the nexus of Popper's reflections, which are essentially aimed at single individuals. 6 References. HA
Quelle: Sociological Abstracts Inc.