Criticizes Popper for not dealing with sciences as factual data, but rather as an untestable ideal image of science. According to the author, Popper ignores the difference between one-level or pure relationship sciences such as formal logic and two-level or theoretical-empirical sciences such as sociology. His deductionist model rests on the assumption that the "empirical basis" of science is unstructured and that order basically is only to be found in "logic", and thus presumably in human thought. As other representatives of such a nominalist creed in the tradition of classical European philosophy he is unable to recognize that human knowledge proceeds in an intergenerational process of enlarging and in part of better adapting the social fund of knowledge to existing structures of the universe. Occasional hints at the necessity of "intersubjective testing" that pretend some insight into the social character of human knowledge, stand almost unconnected in the nexus of Popper's reflections which are essentially aimed at single individuals. (Journal - ZPID)
Quelle: PsychIndex Inc.